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Abstract
This paper develops a model of endogenous growth with overlapping
generations to investigate the joint determination of social security, public
investment and growth in a small open economy. We argue that a pure
pay-as-you-go system provides the taxpayers with the incentives to support
growth-oriented policies, which increase the future productivity of labor.
We nd that outcomes characterized by positive levels of intergenerational
redistribution, public investment and long run growth can be sustained as
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of an innitely repeated intergenerational
game, if and only if the marginal productivity of public capital is large
enough. Furthermore, we show that transfers either comove with public
investment and growth or display a non-monotonic relation, where they
initially increase along with public investment and growth and then de-
crease. (JEL, E62, H55)
We are greatly indebted to Roberto Perotti and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull for their help and
encouragement. We have also beneted from comments and suggestions by Alessandra Casella,
Vincenzo Denicolo', Giovanni Forni, Lorenzo Garbo, Roger Laguno, Andrea Moro, and Stephen
Morris. All errors are ours alone.
1. Intro duction
Most of the recent economic growth models predict that purely redistributive
policies, such as social security programs, should depress growth through nan-
cial crowding out and the adverse incentive eects associated with distortionary
taxation. On the other hand, accumulation may be positively associated with
government expenditure on education and with public investment in infrastruc-
ture or other productive activities. At times where industrialized countries are
confronted with the issue of establishing and maintaining a sound scal policy
while fostering economic growth, the trade-o between productive and redistribu-
tive government expenditures becomes especially harsh and policy prescriptions
calling for a redenition of the nature and scope of the Welfare State gain advo-
cates.
However, these predictions are not entirely supported by data. Some evidence
can in fact be provided regarding the existence of a positive association between
redistributive expenditures as a percentage of GDP and the long run growth
rate. The following table reports the correlation coecients between the average
government redistributive expenditure as a percentage of GDP

TR
Y

, the average
gross public domestic investment as a percentage of GDP

Ig
Y

and the average
annual growth rate of real GDP (x), in a sample of 72 countries for which the
relevant observations are available, in the period 1970-85.
Table 1- Correlation Matrix
x TR=Y Ig=Y
x 1
TR=Y 0.16 1
Ig=Y 0.17 0.10 1
mean 0.01 0.05 0.03
max 0.08 0.20 0.08
min -0.04 0.00 0.00
The redistributive variable TR is calculated as the dierence between govern-
ment transfers to the private sector and interest payments on the outstanding
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stock of public debt, and consists of pensions, unemployment and health bene-
ts alone. Both redistributive expenditure and public investment appear to be
positively correlated with growth. Also, redistributive expenditure and public in-
vestment are positively correlated. When other relevant eects are controlled for,
including measures of the initial level of development, domestic investment (pub-
lic and private), scholarization, government consumption and political instability,
evidence of a positive relation between redistributive expenditure and growth is
maintained.1
? ? ?
We believe that the positive eect of redistributive policies on accumulation
suggested by data can be explained incorporating politics in a standard growth
model. The bulk of the recent political economy models of growth argue that the
composition of social conicts may lead to extensive redistribution which has a
depressive eect on growth.2 Though this intuition is appealing, we think that
it needs qualications. As long as redistribution plays a role in buying social
consensus for growth-oriented activities, it may well foster rather than depress
growth.3 Redistribution evens up the costs and benets of growth across social
classes. If redistribution makes growth socially palatable, the absence of adequate
redistributive programs may fuel a deep social conict resulting in poor economic
and growth performance. The present paper explores this intuition and puts
forward a motivation for why redistributive and growth-oriented policies, though
competing for scarce tax revenues, might go hand in hand and bring about fast
economic growth.
The situation we have in mind is one where sustained growth is generated
1Regressions displaying the average growth rate as the dependent variable and including
various components of government expenditure among regressors have been proposed, among
others, by Barro and Sala-y-Martin [5], Easterly [15], Perotti [22] and Sala-y-Martin [29]. Sala-
Y-Martin [29] explicitely mentions the surprisingly positive coecient of transfers.
2See for instance Alesina and Rodrick [1], Bertola [7], Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull [20],
Perotti [23], Persson and Tabellini [24].
3Sala-y-Martin [29] provides a dierent explanation, where pensions may increase growth if
they are used to force umproductive old workers out of the production process.
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by public investment in capital goods.4 Public investment needs to be nanced
through tax revenues. The feasible level of scal pressure and the allocation of
the governement budget to dierent expenditure components tends to reect the
interests of a majority of the population and is agreed upon collectively. Hetero-
geneous agents bear dierent costs and enjoy dierent gains in the growth process.
Redistribution may help at evening out such dierences, create political support
for taxation and boost the tax revenues available for government expenditure.
In particular, consider a small open economy and assume that while no imped-
iments exist to the mobility of private nancial wealth across national borders,
other factors of production, such as labor and public capital, are non-tradable.
Heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that the economy is populated by over-
lapping generations of nitely-lived and non-altruistic agents living for two peri-
ods. Except for age, agents are identical. Agents work, save and pay taxes when
young and receive a retirement pension benet on top of private savings when old.
Taxation falls on labor income alone. Since labor supply is inelastic, this amounts
to lump-sum taxation. However, tax revenues collection is costly: this is the only
source of distortion in our setup.
In this context, we argue that the entitlement to indexed-to-wages pension
payments at retirement in a pure pay-as-you-go system, nanced out of contribu-
tory taxation, may provide the taxpayers with the incentives to support growth-
oriented policies, since it makes them able to reap some of the benets deriving
from increased taxation that would otherwise be inaccessible to them. In the
absence of intergenerational redistribution, sustained growth would be politically
impracticable, though technically and economically feasible. Indeed, the benets
deriving from (public investment driven) growth are appropriable by taxpayers
through two channels: the increased marginal productivity of private capital and
the growth of unit wages. The latter is lost at retirement. The former is not even
at work, in a small open economy with complete capital mobility, since the interest
rate is xed at the world-wide level.5 Therefore the agreement to allocate some
4Public investment in capital goods includes investment in infrastructure, health facilities
and human capital.
5In the context of an overlapping generation model where partially altruistic agents vote on
the level of public education in the absence of other forms of intergenerational redistribution and
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share of the tax revenues to intergenerational redistribution in each period can
render otherwise impraticable positive levels of taxation and public investment
politically viable and allow the economy to take-o.
Notice that a fully funded system would not achieve the same result, since the
rate of return from that system is exogenous and equal to the worldwide interest
rate.
? ? ?
The relation between redistribution, social cohesion and growth we come to
describe has been proposed by political scientists and economists in dierent con-
texts. The development of social security systems in continental Europe and the
U.S. between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been explained as an
atteimpt of the ruling class to bind the workers' to the State, in response to the
social unrest associated to fast economic growth and the spreading of the Socialist
movement (Rimlinger [25]). This idea also permeates the Solidaristic approach
to development of the small North-European countries, where the expansion of
the Welfare State has been an important political concomitant of liberal trade
and growth-oriented policies (Katzenstein [16], [17]). Besides, the poor economic
performance of some Latin American countries is sometimes explained as a con-
sequence of the deep social conict that, in the virtual absence of a Welfare State
evening out the eects of economic growth, leads to frequent upsurges of social
discontempt that put growth and market-oriented policies at stake (Sachs [26]).
Our interpretation of the social security system as an institution capable of
enlarging the (political) support for growth-oriented policies, is also very close in
spirit to the notion of Welfare State delineated by Gary Becker in his Treatise
on the family. As Becker puts it (pp. 370, [6]): "...expenditures on the elderly
are part of a social compact between generations. Taxes on adults help nance
ecient investments in children. In return, adults receive public pensions and
where growth is led by human capital accumulation, Boldrin [10] shows that no-growth equilibria
can arise also in the case of closed economies, at least at the initial stages of development. This
happens because the return from investment in public education, from the point of view of
taxpayers, is low when the share of income devoted to investment in physical capital is small
relative to its return.
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medical payments when old...Public expenditure on the elderly, together with
public investment, can ll the void left by the breakdown of social norms in
modern societies..." that imposed on the adult members of the family the burden
of investing in the ospring's assets and of supporting the elderly. Becker does
not model formally how such intergenerational agreement should emerge and be
enforced, nor does he explain in detail its characteristics or the consequences for
growth of its introduction, which is indeed our scope.
? ? ?
We think of scal policies as endogenous variables which are determined through
the aggregation of individual preferences by some mechanism such as majority vot-
ing. In the context of dynamic models, a major conceptual problem arises. The
diculty has to do with the relation between current and future policy choices,
the interaction between policy and state variables and with the way expectations
on future policies are formed.
On one hand, it is well known from the public choice literature on social secu-
rity, that, if the future level of pension benets is believed to be independent of
the current one (agents take future policy choices as given, when deciding on the
current ones), a positive level of redistribution can never arise as a political equi-
librium, unless the old are politically predominant. Since there are no incentives
to pay pensions at any point in time, the only rational expectation on the future
level of transfers is zero. In our setup this implies that public investment is also
set equal to zero.
In order to obtain a relation between transfers, public investment and growth,
we need to extend the agents' rationality to encompass strategic behaviour. In
other words, we need to assume that the agents recognize that future policy choices
depend on the current ones. However, the interaction between state variables and
the agents' strategic incentives quickly makes the analysis very complicated in
general, even in standard dynamic models.6 This is where our simple setup helps.
In fact, most complications can be avoided in our model due to the small open
economy assumption and preferences homotheticity.
6For a rigorous analysis of dynamic politico-economic equilibria, see Krusell, Quadrini and
Rios-Rull [20] and Krusell and Rios-Rull [19].
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An analysis of the intertemporal credibility problem of social security was
developed by Sjobolm [28] in a OLG model without production and accumulation
where benets and contributions are determined through a majority vote rule.
The most preferred tax rate by the median voter is shown to be sustainable as a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in a repeated game.7
Very recently, Boldrin and Rustichini [11] extended the analysis to show that a
pay-as-you-go system can be supported as the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of an innitely repeated game in a standard OLG model with capital accumulation
where the level of social security is chosen through majority voting. Within this
model, they investigate the dynamic properties of the social security system and
the impact of changes in the exogenous growth rate of population.
Our contribution uses a similar approach in a OLG model with endogenous
growth to study the joint determination of productive expenditures and transfers,
in order to shed light on the relationship between the pay-as-you-go system and the
rate of growth of the economy. In particular, at the beginning of each period (that
is, in each stage of the game), the young, who act as dictators, choose the shares
of their labor income that they want to devote to pensions for the current old and
to investment in public capital. We can show that, whenever the potential gains
from growth are large enough, an outcome characterized by sustained balanced
growth can be supported as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the innitely
repeated intergenerational game. The credible threat to be denied the entitlement
to pensions in old age by the following generation deters the current young from
defecting by not paying pensions to the coexisting old.8
This equilibrium can be interpreted as the creation by the society of an infor-
mal constraint (social norm) such that the young transfer resources to the old and
carry out investments that will benet the future generations, in exchange for the
old's previous investment and expecting the future generation to follow the same
7The rst author to analyze a median voter model of social security was Browning [12]. A
survey of models of voting for social security that followed and extended Browning's contribution
can be found in Boadway and Wildasin [8]. See also Tabellini [30].
8Notice that the agents that are called on to act in each stage of the game are in every respect
identical. Therefore, in order to characterize their optimal course of action, we simply need to
solve standard maximization problems.
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norm.
The main results of our model can be summarized as follows:
 If the strategies of the players are history-independent, that is, the young
do not take into account the past histories when choosing their actions,
the only subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is such that there is no public
investment, no redistribution and the economy experiences no growth.
 If and only if the marginal productivity of public capital is large enough,
stationary outcomes characterized by positive levels of redistribution, pub-
lic investment and a positive rate of long-run growth can be sustained as
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the innitely repeated intergenerational
game. In particular, we study those scal policies that maximize the welfare
of the young, who behave as dictators at each stage of the game.
 In a neighborhood of the equilibrium with positive growth: (a) the share of
public investment in labor income and the rate of growth comove in response
to changes in the exogenous variables; (b) the share of transfers in labor
income either comoves with growth or displays a non-monotonic relation
where transfers initially increase along with growth and then decrease.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and the
policy game and discusses both the competitive equilibrium and the equilibrium of
the game. Section 3 presents the comparative statics results. Section 4 concludes.
2. The mo del
2.1. The economicenvironment
We analyze a small open economy with two-period lived overlapping generations
agents. Population is assumed to be constant: in each period, an equal mass
of young and old is alive, which we both normalize to one. Labor is supplied
inelastically by the young.
The utility of an individual born at time t is given by:
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U t

ctt; c
t
t+1

= log

ctt

+  log

ctt+1

(2.1)
where cts is the consumption at time s of an agent born at time t:
Output is produced according to the following production function:
Yt = L

tK
1 
t g

t (2.2)
where L denotes aggregate labor, K denotes aggregate private capital, g = G=L
is the amount of public capital per worker and  is the total factor productivity
which is assumed to be constant. Following Barro [3], we assume that public
services are rival and excludable.
The laws of motion of private and public capital are given by:
Kt+1 = (1  K)Kt + I
p
t (2.3)
Gt+1 = (1  G)Gt + I
g
t (2.4)
Private capital can move between the foreign and the domestic production
sector at no cost. The worldwide interest rate on nancial assets is denoted by
r  0:
2.2. The game
In our model, the young consume, save and may use part of their labor income
to nance investment in public capital and transfers to the old. We will analyze
the choice of these two scal policies in the context of an innitely repeated
intergenerational game. Let us begin by describing the "constituent" stage game
 . At time t, the young, who represent the majority of the population, decide what
fraction of their labor income to devolve to public investment and to transfers.
These fractions (tax rates) are denoted by i;t and tr;t:
Notice that, in each stage of the game, the old play no role in the determination
of the equilibrium policies. This is in line with the main purpose of the paper, that
is to investigate the joint determination of transfers and productive expenditures,
in relation with the rate of growth, in order to nd an explanation for why even
the young (i.e. the taxpayers) may decide to support an equilibrium with positive
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transfers. In this context, the preferences of the old for the maximum level of
redistribution would not add much insight.9
Let At = (i;t; tr;t) be the action space with i;t; tr;t  0 and t  i;t+tr;t  1:
We will consider a repeated game with perfect information where players can
observe all previous actions. Thus, let ht = (i0; tr0; i1; tr1; :::; i;t 1; tr;t 1) be
the history of the game at the end of stage t  1: Furthermore, we let h0 = ;:
In this setting, a strategy for the young is a contingent plan of how to play in
each stage t for possible history ht: If we denote with Ht the set of all possible
histories ht, a strategy t is a map from the set Ht to the action space At; that
is, t (ht) 2 At for all ht.
For every history (i0; tr0; :::; i;t; tr;t; :::) of actions, the payo to each player
t is given by her lifetime utility, evaluated at the competitive equilibrium with
(i;t; tr;t) and (i;t+1; tr;t+1) :
2.3. The economicequilibrium
We will now characterize the competitive equilibrium of our economy, given a
sequence of histories fhtg
1
t=0
:
An agent born at time t solves the following maximization problem:
V t =max
ct
t
;ct
t+1
n
log

ctt

+  log

ctt+1
o
(2.5)
subject to:
ctt = wt (1  t)  st
ctt+1 = st(1 + r) + TRt+1
(2.6)
where TRt+1 = tr;t+1 (1  i;t+1   tr;t+1)wt+1:
Here, we assume that there are convex costs in collecting taxes; if the young at
time t put aside t of their labor income for public expenditures, only 
0
t  (t   
2
t )
is available to nance public investment and/or lump-sum transfers to the old.
9If we assumed a positive rate of growth of population, at each point in time the young would
be the majority of the population. We could then dene the equilibrium policies as the outcome
of a majority rule vote.
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Assuming also that there is no borrowing, the actual levels of public investment
and transfers are thus given by:
Igt = t
0
twt
TRt = (1  t) 
0
twt
(2.7)
where t  i;t=t and (1  t)  tr;t=t. Notice that both the level of public
investment and the level of transfers can be written in terms of i;t and tr;t: In
particular, we have:
Igt = [i;t(1  i;t   tr;t)]wt (2.8)
TRt = [tr;t(1  i;t   tr;t)]wt (2.9)
The solution to problem (2.5) yields the following saving function:
s(r; wt; t; TRt+1) =

1 + 
wt(1  t) 
TRt+1
(1 + )(1 + r)
= st (2.10)
Private nancial wealth at the beginning of period t + 1; At+1, is thus given by
the savings of the young at time t, namely At+1 = s(r; wt; t; TRt+1). From rst
order conditions for prot maximization we get:
wt = Yt
qt = (1  )
Yt
Kt
(2.11)
where qt is the rental rate of capital. Equilibrium conditions on the goods and
assets markets imply:
Ft+1 = Ft+1   Ft = St   It (2.12)
qt = K + r (2.13)
where St and Ft respectively denote aggregate savings and the stock of net foreign
assets held by the private sector at time t and where Ft = At  Kt. It can easily
be veried that the competitive equilibrium implies10:
10From now on, we will set G = 0:
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Kt
Gt
=  =



1  
r + K
 1

(2.14)
Yt
Gt
=  =

1  
r + K
 1 


1
 (2.15)
Let xZt denote the rate of growth of Z. By observation of (2.14) and (2.15) it
should be clear that, in equilibrium, xKt = x
Y
t = x
G
t = xt 8t. The economy's
dynamics in equilibrium is characterized by:
Gt+1 = i;t(1   i;t   tr;t)1 Gt
Ft+1 =

&t  
&t 1
1 + xt

  xt

Gt
(2.16)
where:
&t =
s(r; wt; t; TRt+1)
Gt
Dening the Balanced Growth Path (BGP) as the locus where all variables
grow at a constant (possibly common) rate and t =  8t; it can be veried
that constancy of policy variables over time, i.e. i;t = i and tr;t = tr 8t, is
both necessary and sucient for the economy to move along a stationary path
with sustained growth. It is also immediate to recognize that, along the BGP,
xF = xK = xY = xG = x, where the equation for the rate of growth is given by:
x = i(1   i   tr) (2.17)
In our model, growth is driven by the accumulation of capital in the public
sector, which is nanced out of tax revenues on labor income. This implies that,
given the share of GDP to be devoted to public investment at each point in
time, the equilibrium rate of growth is increasing with the average product of
public capital in production, , which is constant over time and is exogenously
determined by the worldwide interest rate r and the technological parameters,
K ; and : Notice that, along stationary paths, the ratio of public investment
to GDP, i(1  i   tr), is constant, so that the technology for the accumulation
of public capital exhibits constant returns.
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Therefore, given policy variables, the equilibrium rate of growth is increasing
with the equilibrium marginal productivity of public capital . Given , changes
in the exogenous variables that trigger an increase in the average productivity of
public capital, , stimulate growth. Instead, the overall eect of an increase in 
on growth is a priori indeterminate. In fact, although increases in  raise taxable
income and foster growth, the eect on the average product  may turn out to be
negative.
Given the marginal productivity of public capital, growth is increasing with
the share of public investment in labor income, i(1   i   tr); which in turn
depends on policy variables. An increase in i has a twofold eect on growth: on
one hand, it increases the share of tax revenues allocated to public investment
and stimulates growth; on the other hand, it depresses growth through the higher
ineciency of taxation. An increase in redistribution, as implied by an increase
in tr, unambiguously depresses growth, since it both reduces the share of rev-
enues allocated to public investment and increases the collection costs of taxes.
Nevertheless, as we will extensively show, there cannot exist an equilibrium with
positive growth and no redistribution.
Let us now characterize the economic equilibrium that arises when all histories
of previous actions are given by the null vector, that is, ht = (0; 0; :::::0) for all
t. From (2.17), it is immediate to verify that, in this case, there is no economic
growth and the equilibrium allocations in every period are given by:
cy =
1
1 + 
Y0
co =
 

1 + 
Y0
!
(1 + r)
(2.18)
where Y0 is the given initial level of output, cy and co denote consumption when
young and old, respectively.
2.4.Equilibria of the game
Going back to the game   that we described above, assume now that every young
generation adopts a history-independent strategy. In other words, in each period
the selected actions (policies) do not depend on the past realizations of actions.
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In this case, we can immediately conclude that the only subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of the innitely repeated game   (1) is to set i;t = tr;t = 0, for all
t. In fact, if future actions will be independent of the current ones, there is no
incentive whatsoever for the young to carry the cost of paying transfers to the
old. Consequently, the young have no interest to invest in public capital as well,
since they anticipate that future generations will behave in the same way so that
they will not receive pensions when old. Thus, we can summarize this discussion
as follows:
Proposition 1. If every generation adopts a history-independent strategy, the
only subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the innitely repeated game   (1) is
 = (0; 0) :
In conclusion, if there is no link between past and current policies, the young
will neither invest in public capital nor pay transfers to the old, the economy will
experience no growth and the consumption allocations will be equal to cy and co:
Clearly, this equilibrium is not very satisfactory. More generally, actions are
function of the history of the game. Thus, our next step will be to allow agents to
adopt history-dependent strategies and to characterize the equilibrium outcomes
in this case; in particular, we will show that there are cases where it is possible
to construct equilibrium strategies such that the outcome of the game will yield
strictly positive values for both i;t and tr;t, and all generations will be better o
than in the equilibrium that we have just described.
Consider rst the following equilibrium candidate of our game:
( i ; 

tr) = argmax
i;tr
flog [W (i; tr; r;X)wt] + Cg
s:t: W (i; tr; r;X) =
h
(1  i   tr) (1 + r + tr) + i  tr (1  i   tr)
2X
i
i  0 tr  0 i + tr  1
(2.19)
where X   represents the marginal productivity of public capital and C is a
function of parameters.
In words,  i and 

tr maximize the indirect utility function of the young, when
future policies are restricted to be equal to the current ones. Clearly, the indirect
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utility is obtained by plugging the optimal saving function (2.10) in the utility
function (2.5); furthermore, it is easy to show that the couple ( i ; 

tr) that solves
(2.19) is the same that maximizes the function W (i; tr; r;X).
Notice that  i and 

tr can be seen as the ecient steady state tax rates, in the
sense that they maximize the welfare of each generation of taxpayers. Notice also
that the solution to the problem (2.19) is time independent, given the constancy
of the interest rate r and of the equilibrium marginal productivity of public capital
X.
In the construction of the equilibrium strategy, we will introduce another policy
outcome, which maximizes the indirect utility of the young when they do not
pay transfer to (i.e. punish) the old, but nevertheless expect that the following
generation will select the ecient policies  i and 

tr.
11 We denote this outcome
as i, where:
i =argmax
i
f(1  i) (1 + r) +  tr (1  

i   

tr) [1 + i (1  i)X]g
s:t: 0  i  1
(2.20)
Assume now that the young at time t adopt the following strategy, that we
will denote by t (ht) :
1. if ht = ;; t = (i; 0)
2. if ht = (;  i ; 

tr) ; 

t = (

i ; 

tr)
3. if ht =

; 
0
i ; 
0
tr

; with either  0i 6= 

i or 
0
tr 6= 

tr or both, count the number
of consecutive periods up to t   1 included with t = 0 excluded, where
i 6=  i and/or tr 6= 

tr: Let this number be denoted by N :
1. if N is even, t = (

i ; 

tr)
2. if N is odd, t = (i; 0) :
In words, we constructed a strategy such that, at any point in time t, if the
old did not "cooperate" in the previous period (i.e. they did not play  i ; 

tr),
11It is easy to verify, by observation of 2.19 and 2.20, that i  i:
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they are punished by the current young, unless the old had deviated because they
were punishing generation t  2 for deviating. After the punishment period, the
"good" equilibrium is immediately restored.
If every generation adopts the strategy t (ht), the outcome of the innitely
repeated game will be ( i ; 

tr) for all t; expect for t = 0; where the outcome is
(i; 0). Notice that, there is actually an innite number of stationary outcomes
with positive i and tr which can be supported as a subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium, using the strategy that we described before. In particular, we can show a
Folk-theorem-like result where all individually rational outcomes can be sustained
as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. However, the selected equilibrium outcome
(i; 0;  i ; 

tr; 

i ; 

tr; :::) is, by construction, the one that maximizes the welfare of
the agents who are the majority of the population in each stage of the game.
From now on, we will limit the analysis only to the selected equilibrium
(i; 0;  i ; 

tr; 

i ; 

tr; :::), which becomes the equilibrium of our model.
In order to prove that the strategy t (ht) is a subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium of the innitely repeated game   (1), we need a preliminary result about
the necessary and sucient condition for the existence of an interior solution to
the maximization problem (2.19).
Notice rst that the rst order conditions of (2.19) are given by:
Wi =  (1 + r + 

tr) + 

tr(1  

i   

tr)X(1   3

i   

tr) = 0 (2.21)
Wtr =  (1+r+

tr)+(1  

i   

tr)+

i (1 

i  

tr)X (1  

i   3

tr) = 0 (2.22)
These conditions can be explained intuitively as follows. In our model there
exist two alternative forms of investment, in private or public capital. The net rate
of return on the former, in equilibrium, is exogenously determined by the world-
wide interest rate r, while the gross rate of return on the latter is endogenous
and corresponds to the ratio between the pension received and the taxes paid
by each generation, that is
tr (1  i   tr) [1 + i (1  i   tr)X]
i + tr
. Each dollar
levied to nance public investment or social security correspondingly reduces the
total amount of resources available for investment in private capital. The marginal
opportunity cost of increasing any of the tax rates is therefore given by r. Instead,
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the marginal benet of increasing any of the tax rates is given by the marginal
net return from investment in public capital, that is the marginal increase in
pension income minus one. By conditions (2.21)-(2.22),  i and 

tr are such that
the marginal cost of increasing each of the tax rates is equal to the marginal
benet of increasing it, or, equivalently,  i and 

tr are such that the marginal net
rate of return from investment in public capital is equal to the net rate of return
from investment in private capital and to the world-wide interest rate r.
Although (2.21)-(2.22) form a non-linear system in i and tr, and closed form
solutions for  i and 

tr cannot be found, we are nonetheless able to derive some
results which allow us to characterize the solution to the problem of the young.
First of all, note that  i and 

tr bear the relation:
 i (1  

i )X = 

tr (1  

tr)X   1 (2.23)
as it can be easily veried by subtracting (2.21) from (2.22). Second, we can show
that:
Lemma 1. If the solution to the problem of the middle-aged (2.19) lies on the
boundary, then the solution is ( i ; 

tr) = (0; 0).
Proof. Set tr = 0. Then from (2.21), Wi =   (1 + r) < 0, which implies
 i = 0. Now, set i = 0: Again, from (2.22), Wtr =   (r + 2tr) < 0, which
implies  tr = 0: Finally, if i + tr = 1; both Wi and Wtr tend to  1:
The intuition for this result is pretty obvious. When there is no investment in
public capital and consequently no growth, as it is implied by setting i = 0, the
economy is dynamically ecient, as long as r  0, and there is no welfare gain
for the young from the introduction of a social security system. Besides, in the
absence of pensions (tr = 0), the young are never willing to nance growth. This
depends on the small open economy and complete capital mobility assumptions
which imply that public investment has no eect on the equilibrium interest rate.
Third, we can show that:
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Lemma 2. For X approaching innity, the solution of the problem of the middle
aged (2.19) is ( i ; 

tr) =

1
4
; 1
4

.
Proof. Note thatW (i; tr; r;X) =  (i; tr; r)+X	(i; tr), where  (i; tr; r) =
(1 + r + tr) (1  i   tr) and 	 (i; tr) = i  tr(1   i   tr)2. It is easily ver-
ied that the function 	 (i; tr) has a unique maximum at

1
4
; 1
4

, or equiva-
lently, that there exists " > 0 such that 	

1
4
; 1
4

  	(i; tr)  C", (i; tr) =2
D

1
4
; 1
4

; "

. Now note that W

1
4
; 1
4
; r;X

 X 	

1
4
; 1
4

, since  (i; tr; r)  0.
Moreover W (i; tr; r;X)  max  (i; tr; r) + X	(i; tr) and W

1
4
; 1
4
; r;X

 
W (i; tr; r;X)  X
h
	

1
4
; 1
4

 	(i; tr)
i
 max  (i; tr; r), 8 (i; tr) =2 D

1
4
; 1
4

; "

.
Note also that the LHS term in the last inequality is strictly positive for X
large enough. Then, for X large enough, W

1
4
; 1
4
; r;X

 W (i; tr; r;X) > 0, 8
(i; tr) =2 D

1
4
; 1
4

; "

, or, equivalently, W (i; tr; r;X) has a unique maximum
at

1
4
; 1
4

, for X large enough.
By observation of (2.19), it is clear that the young can benet from output
growth only through the consequent growth in pension benets. The growth rate
of benets is indeed equal to the output and wages growth, since the ratio of
transfers to wages is constant over time. The utility of the young is therefore
increasing in the growth rate of output. Given policy variables, this is increasing
with the equilibrium value of the marginal productivity of public capital X. Using
this intuition it is possible to establish the following important result:
Proposition 2. There exists a value of the marginal productivity of public capi-
tal X , such that, if and only if X >X the maximization problem (2.19) yields an
interior solution, ( i ; 

tr), with 

i 2 (0;
1
4
],  tr 2 (0;
1
4
].
Proof. By Lemma 2 we know that ( i ; 

tr) =

1
4
; 1
4

is the unique absolute
maximum of (2.19), as X ! +1. Since the rst term in W is decreasing in i
and tr, it turns out that interior solutions are such that  i 2 (0;
1
4
];  tr 2 (0;
1
4
].
A sucient condition for W (i; tr; r;X) to admit interior solutions is:
W

1
4
;
1
4
; r;X

=

1 + r
2
+
1
8
+
1
64
X

> W (0; 0; r; ; K) = (1 + r)
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which is satised forX 24 32r > 0. Therefore, ifX > X = 24+32r, the solution
to (2.19) will be an interior one. Note that, asX ! 0, the unique solution to (2.19)
is (0; 0), since (1  i   tr) (1 + r + tr) < (1 + r) 8 (i; tr) 6= (0; 0). Now take X
suciently small to obtain ( i ; 

tr) = (0; 0) and consider decreasing values of X.
Notice that neither  i nor 

tr can ever take values above zero as X decreases, since
the rst term in (2.19) is monotonically decreasing in i and tr. Therefore, there
exists a threshold X X such that for X  X , the solution to (2.19) is (0; 0),
while for X > X , the solution to (2.19) is ( i ; 

tr) with 

i 2 (0;
1
4
];  tr 2 (0;
1
4
].
The above results make clear that an equilibrium with positive taxation and
growth may or may not exist, depending on whether the gains from growth, that
the young enjoy in presence of pension benets, are suciently large so that they
prefer the equilibrium with positive growth to the no-growth equilibrium.
For given policy variables, the size of such gains increases with the equilibrium
value of the marginal productivity of public capital, X. The role of parameters,
(K ;; ), and the interest rate, r, in determining how large is X will be investi-
gated in the following section. Notice also that the constancy of X at equilibrium,
as implied by equation (2.15), ensures that the conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium with sustained positive growth are not put at stake by the accumula-
tion process.
Moreover, in our set up, positive growth rates can arise only if some share
of the total tax revenue is allocated to social security. In fact, positive growth
requires positive public investment at each point in time. This in turn requires the
share of public investment in after tax income to be positive. Since the young can
reap part of the benets deriving from investment in public capital only through
the revaluation of future pensions payments, public investment in after tax income
can only be positive if the share of transfers in after tax income is also positive,
since this ensures that positive levels of pensions will be paid in the future.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section:
Proposition 3. If and only if X > X ; t (ht) is a subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium of the innitely repeated game   (1).
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How can we characterize the competitive equilibrium associated with the equi-
librium outcome (i; 0;  i ; 

tr; 

i ; 

tr; :::)? First of all, note that the sequences of
equilibrium levels of public investment and social security expenditure are given
by:
Ig0 = i (1  i)w0
TR0 = 0
Igt = i
wt for t = 1; 2; :::1
TRt = trwt for t = 1; 2; :::1
Second, note that, since t = 1, the economy moves along a stationary path where
all economic variables grow at the common constant rate:
x = iX (2.24)
where i =  i (1  

i   

tr) and tr
 =  tr (1  

i   

tr) are the constant equilib-
rium shares of labor income which are devolved, respectively, to public investment
and transfers, since t = 1. Note that tr can also be interpreted as the equilib-
rium pension replacement rate on earnings. Moreover, consumption allocations
are equal to:
c00 =
w0
(1 + )
"
(1  i) +
tr (1 + x)
(1 + r)
#
c01 =
w0
1 + 
[(1 + r) (1  i) + tr (1 + x)]
ctt =
wt
(1 + )
"
(1   ) +
tr (1 + x)
(1 + r)
#
for t = 1; 2; :::1
ctt+1 =
wt
1 + 
[(1 + r) (1   ) + tr (1 + x)] for t = 1; 2; :::1
(2.25)
where   =  i + 

tr is the constant contributory tax rate, or, equivalently, the
constant level of scal pressure, since t = 1, and x = i (1  i)X is the growth
rate realized between t = 0 and t = 1.
Note that our social norm is such that expenditure on public investment is
initiated (one period) before expenditure on social security, so that the rst gen-
eration of old receives zero pensions. This feature of the equilibrium is consistent
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with the history of the introduction of Welfare States in most Western coun-
tries, where the birth of social security systems followed the institution of other
programs, such as public education and public investment in infrastructure.
It is worthwhile to stress that the adoption of the equilibrium strategy  (ht)
yields an eciency gain, because the corresponding competitive equilibrium yields
a level of utility for all generations higher than in the equilibrium that we analyzed
in the previous subsection, where i = tr = 0 and there is no growth. Indeed,
when X > X; the young would rather put aside a fraction   of their labor income
and receive a fraction  tr of the future income, than not pay any taxes and not
receive any transfer. Furthermore, the old generations clearly benet from the
introduction of the social security system.
Going back to the motivation of this work, we would like to interpret our
equilibrium as the emergence of a social norm, whereby pensions are paid in
every period to the old generations in exchange for their previous investment
in activities which beneted the current young. This social norm arises as the
equilibrium outcome of the innitely repeated game, where the credible threat of
being punished by not receiving any transfer, in case the norm is violated, makes
all generations better o, by following it.
3. Comparativ e Statics
In the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that arises if the equilibrium strategy
 (ht) is played by each subsequent generation of taxpayers, public investment,
social security expenditure and growth are endogenously and simultaneously de-
termined variables, whose size depends crucially on the equilibrium value of the
marginal productivity of public capital in production, X, which in turn is uniquely
determined, given the interest rate, r, and the technology parameters, K; and
.
In this section, we study the eects on public investment, social security expen-
diture and growth of ceteris paribus variations in r; K ; and , by investigating
the comparative statics properties of this equilibrium, for t  1. The main re-
sults of this investigation are as follows: (1) the equilibrium value of the marginal
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productivity of public capital X is decreasing with r; K and  and is increasing
with ; (2) the equilibrium share of public investment in labor income i and the
equilibrium income growth rate x respond positively to changes in K ; and 
that trigger increases in X and are decreasing with r; (3) the share of transfers
in labor income tr responds positively to changes in K ; and  that trigger
increases in X and is decreasing with r, if r  0:5 and/or X is below a threshold
value fX . When r < 0:5 and X > fX, tr may respond negatively to changes in
K ; and  that trigger increases in X and it may be increasing with r.
In order to determine how i, tr and x respond to changes in r; K ; and ,
we use the following procedure. First, we study the function X (r; K;; ) and,
in particular, we determine the sign of the partial derivatives of X with respect
to r; K ; and . Second, we derive a sucient condition for  i and 

tr to be
dierentiable in r and X. Whenever this condition is satised, the sign of the
partial derivatives of  i and 

tr with respect to r and X can be determined by
applying the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT ). Third, we combine these results
to establish the direction of adjustment of  i and 

tr to variations in r; K; and
. Finally, we pin down the eects of changes in r; K; and  on i, tr and x.
Our rst result, which we state without proof, provides some information on
the limiting behavior of the function X (r; K;; ). In particular, it is immediate
to show that:
Lemma 3.
lim
K!0
X = X 000 > 0 lim
!0
X = 0 limX
!0
= +1
lim
K!1
X = X 001 < 0 lim
!1
X = +1 lim
!1
X = 0
Consider now the subset of vectors of exogenous variables such that the nec-
essary and sucient condition for the existence of interior solutions to the maxi-
mization problem (2.19) is satised, that is restrict attention to choices of r; K ;
and  such that X > X.
Then we can prove the following:
Lemma 4. IfX >X , the equilibrium value of the marginal productivity of public
capital is strictly greater than one. Moreover:
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@X
@r
< 0
@X
@K
< 0
@X
@
> 0
Proof. From (2.21) it can be veried that interior solutions to (2.19) can be
obtained only if X > 1. It is immediate to check that X > 1 implies
@X
@r
< 0,
@X
@K
< 0 and
@X
@
> 0.
The intuition for the above result is pretty obvious. Recall that the marginal
productivity of public capital is the product of two factors: the elasticity of public
capital in production, , and the average productivity of public capital, . For
given , the latter is an increasing function of the private to public capital stock
ratio, , which in turn is decreasing with r and K and is increasing with .
The sign of the partial derivative of X with respect to , is ambiguous apriori
and depends on the exogenous variables. A sucient condition to obtain a nega-
tive overall eect of  on X is given by  (1  ) > r + K , which we henceforth
assume to be satised.
Before applying the IFT to determine the sign of the partial derivatives of
 i and 

tr with respect to r and X, we need to make sure that 

i and 

tr are
dierentiable in r and X. The following result guarantees that this is indeed the
case, at least for X large enough.
Proposition 4. There exists a value of the marginal productivity of public cap-
ital, cX >X , such that, if X > cX, the maximization problem (2.19) yields an
interior, unique and dierentiable solution, ( i (r;X) ; 

tr (r;X)), with 

i 2 (0;
1
4
]
and  tr 2 (0;
1
4
].
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 4 implies that all the dierentiable solutions to (2.19) are also
interior solutions. For cX > X > X , there may exist interior and non-dierentiable
solutions to (2.19).
Henceforth, we restrict our attention to choices of the exogenous variables such
that X > cX. Then, we can prove the following:
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Proposition 5. The partial derivative of the equilibrium public investment tax
and of the equilibrium social security tax with respect to the interest rate is
strictly negative, while the partial derivative of the equilibrium public investment
tax and of the social security tax with respect to the marginal productivity of
public capital is strictly positive, for X <1. Namely, for X <1, we have:
@ i (r;X)
@r
< 0
@ i (r;X)
@X
> 0
@ tr (r;X)
@r
< 0
@ tr (r;X)
@X
> 0
Moreover:
lim
X!1
@ i (r;X)
@r
= 0 lim
X!1
@ i (r;X)
@X
= 0
lim
X!1
@ tr (r;X)
@r
= 0 lim
X!1
@ tr (r;X)
@X
= 0
Proof. See Appendix B.
To grasp the intuition behind these results, some observations are in order.
First, recall that, in equilibrium, the marginal benet of increasing any of the tax
rates, which is the marginal net return from public investment, or, equivalently,
the marginal increase in pension income minus one, must be equal to the marginal
opportunity cost of increasing any of the tax rates, that is the net rate of return
from other forms of investment, r. Second, note that, in equilibrium, the total
tax revenue is increasing with both tax rates, while the marginal tax revenue
is decreasing with them. In fact, the marginal increase in revenue following an
increase in any of the tax rate is equal to [1  2 ( i + 

tr)], which is positive for
( i ; 

tr) 

1
4
; 1
4

and is decreasing with  i and 

tr, due to the convex collection
cost of taxes. Third, note that, given  tr, the marginal benet of increasing 

i is
diminishing, since tr becomes progressively smaller and the total and marginal
collection costs of taxes become progressively larger as  i increases. Given 

i ,
the marginal benet of increasing  tr, is also diminishing, since i
 becomes pro-
gressively smaller and the total and marginal collection costs of taxes become
progressively larger as  tr increases. Fourth, note that an increase in 

tr (

i ) also
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has a cross eect on the marginal benet of increasing  i (

tr). The sign of such
eect is ambiguous: an increase in  tr implies higher total and marginal collection
costs, on one hand, and a larger transfer share, on the other hand, while an in-
crease in  i implies higher total and marginal collection costs, on one hand, and
a larger public investment share, on the other hand. However, our results imply
that these eects, if negative, are not very large in absolute value.
Starting from an equilibrium situation, an increase in X, given r, increases
the rate of growth of labor income and the return on investment in public capital,
for given tax rates. As a consequence, the marginal benet of increasing any of
the tax rates becomes larger than the marginal opportunity cost of increasing it.
In order to restore the equilibrium, both tax rates must be increased. In fact,
this implies a reduction of the marginal benet of increasing any of the tax rates.
On the contrary, an increase in r, given X, pushes the opportunity cost of each
additional dollar paid out in taxes up. In order to restore the equilibrium, both
tax rates must then be reduced.
Putting together Lemma 4 and Propositions 5, it is immediate to conclude
that:
Corollary 1. The equilibrium value of both tax rates is strictly increasing with
the total factor productivity and strictly decreasing with the depreciation rate of
private capital, the elasticity of public capital in production and the interest rate,
for X <1. Namely, for X <1, we have:
d i
dr
< 0
d i
dK
< 0
d i
d
> 0
d i
d
< 0
d tr
dr
< 0
d tr
dK
< 0
d tr
d
> 0
d tr
d
< 0
Moreover:
lim
X!1
d i
dz
= 0 z = r;; K; 
lim
X!1
d tr
dz
= 0 z = r;; K; 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Changes of the technology parameters that imply an increase in X lead to
higher equilibrium values of both tax rates. Instead, ceteris paribus increases in
the interest rate, r, decrease the equilibrium value of both tax rates, since both
the direct eect, through the increased opportunity cost, and the indirect eect,
through the reduced value of X, push in this direction.
Having characterized the eect of changes in the exogenous variables on the
equilibrium tax rates, we now turn our attention on the eect of such changes on
the equilibrium shares of labor income which are devoted to public investment
and social security and on the equilibrium growth rate of income.
As for the equilibrium public investment share and the equilibrium income
growth rate, we can prove the following:
Proposition 6. The equilibrium share of public investment in labor income is
strictly increasing with the total factor productivity and strictly decreasing with
the depreciation rate of private capital, the elasticity of public capital in produc-
tion and the interest rate, for X <1. Namely, for X <1, we have:
di
d
> 0
di
dK
< 0
di
d
< 0
di
dr
< 0
Moreover:
lim
X!1
di
dz
= 0 z = r;; K; 
Proof. See Appendix B.
By putting together Proposition 6 and Lemma 4, it is then immediate to
conclude that:
Corollary 2. The equilibrium rate of growth of income is strictly increasing with
the total factor productivity and strictly decreasing with the depreciation rate of
private capital, the elasticity of public capital in production and the interest rate.
That is:
dx
d
> 0
dx
dK
< 0
dx
d
< 0
dx
dr
< 0
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To grasp the intuition behind these results the following observations are in
order.
First, by Proposition 5, we know that changes in the exogenous variables that
make investment in public capital more remunerative, relative to investment in
private capital, imply a stronger scal pressure at equilibrium, since both  i and
 tr increase as a consequence of such changes.
Second, note that, given the level of scal pressure, such changes also imply
that a larger share of tax revenue is allocated to public investment in equilibrium.
To verify this statement, let   =  i + 

tr denote the equilibrium level of scal
pressure, and  denote the equilibrium share of tax revenue allocated to public
investment. Pension income, can then be rewritten as:
  (1   ) (1  ) [1 +   (1   )X] (3.1)
which, given  , is maximized for  =
1
2
 
1
2  (1   )X
. As X increases,
the marginal benet of increasing  becomes larger. In fact, the partial deriva-
tive of the average pension benet with respect to , [  (1   )]2 (1  2)X 
  (1   ), is increasing with X, if  
1
2
, as it is indeed the case, since  i  

tr,
in equilibrium.
Third, note that the marginal benet of increasing  is diminishing, as it can
be veried by observing that the second partial derivative of pension income with
respect to  is negative. In fact, as  increases, the marginal benet of increasing
, in terms of increased public investment, falls, since the transfer share in labor
income becomes progressively smaller, while the marginal cost of increasing , in
terms of reduced transfers, increases, since the public investment share in labor
income becomes progressively larger. The last two observations imply that, as X
increases,  must increase in order to restore the equilibrium.
Starting from an equilibrium situation, increases in , or decreases in K , ,
or r, increase X. This implies that both  and  increase. This explains why i
and x both increase, following such changes.
The fact that i increases, following increases in , or decreases in K, ,
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or r, does not necessarily imply that tr decreases, as a consequence of such
changes. Our intuition goes as follows. We know that, for small X and  , the
total and marginal collection costs of taxes are also small. Then, the increase
in tax revenue associated to increases in , or decreases in K , , or r, will be
large enough to compensate for the reduction in the equilibrium share of revenues
allocated to transfers and tr will be increasing with  and decreasing with K, ,
and r. As X and   become progressively larger, the total and marginal collection
costs of taxes increase. For some critical value of X, they may become so high
that the increase in tax revenue no longer compensates for the reduction in the
equilibrium share of revenues allocated to transfers and tr may start to decrease
with  and to increase with K , , and r. This argument suggests that tr
should increase or decrease, following ceteris paribus variations in the exogenous
variables, depending on the equilibrium value of the marginal productivity of
public capital.
Although the intuition is pretty clear, a general result regarding the sign of
the variation of tr in response to changes in the exogenous variables is hard to
establish. Still, we can prove the following:
Proposition 7. If r  0:5, the equilibrium share of transfers in labor income
is strictly increasing with the total factor productivity and strictly decreasing
with the depreciation rate of private capital, the elasticity of public capital in
production and the interest rate. That is:
dtr
d
> 0
dtr
dK
< 0
dtr
d
< 0
dtr
dr
< 0 if r  0:5
If r < 0:5, there exists a vector of values of the marginal productivity of public
capital,
hfXzi, z = r; K ;; , cX  fXz <1, such that:
dtr
dz
 0 cX < fXz z = r; K ; 
dtr
d
 0 cX < fX
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Moreover:
lim
X!eX 

dtr
d
> 0 lim
X!eX z
dtr
dz
> 0 z = r; K; 
lim
X!1
dtr
d
< 0 lim
X!1
dtr
dz
> 0 z = r; K ; 
Proof. See Appendix B.
Summing up, our model implies that x, i and tr will comove in response
to ceteris paribus changes in the exogenous variable z, if r  0:5 or if r < 0:5 andcX < X < fXz. When r < 0:5 and X  fXz, tr will move in the opposite direction
with respect to x and i, in response to ceteris paribus variations of z, if X tends
to fXz from above or if X tends to innity.
Even if the response of tr to ceteris paribus variations of z can not be charac-
terized analitically for fXz < X <1 and r < 0:5, our intuition is that tr should
move in the opposite direction with respect to x and i in this range. This intu-
ition is supported by numerical simulations of the model, which indicate that the
derivatives of the transfer share function with respect to the exogenous variables
change sign at most once as X varies within the range of values such that (2.19)
admits interior and dierentiable solutions.
Before concluding this section, we want to stress once again the intuition
behind the results we obtained.
The emergence of a credible social norm (Welfare State), whereby pensions and
public investment are nanced in every period by labor income taxation, allows all
generations to enjoy the benets associated to (public-investment driven) growth.
The social norm reects the interests of the current taxpayers and will be modied
if the environment changes due to exogenous shocks. In particular, if the marginal
productivity of public capital in production increases, it seems reasonable that the
social norm should be modied in order to allow the taxpayers to reap the benet
associated to the larger growth potential. Namely, it seems reasonable that the
social norm should be modied by increasing the level of scal pressure so as to
boost public investment, growth and future pensions.
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If the marginal productivity of public capital and, consequently, the level of
scal pressure and the total and marginal collection costs of taxes are not very
large, the social norm should also be modied by increasing the replacement rate
on earnings, that is the share of transfers in labor income, since this allows for
further increases in future pensions and provides further benets for the current
taxpayers. On the other hand, if the marginal productivity of public capital is
large and so are the total and marginal collection costs of taxes, increases in public
investment and future pensions can only be obtained by reshuing the current
public expenditure from social security to public investment, that is by reducing
the replacement rate on earnings. Note that current pensions will increase along
with public investment in the former case, while they will decrease in the latter.
In other words, our model provides an intuitive argument for why an expanding
pie can make the distribution conict between the young and the old less stringent.
Since the young can benet from higher growth only by increasing pensions, the
replacement rate on earnings tr may wind up being increased, along with public
investment and growth, so that both current and future pensions increase, in order
to exploit an expanding growth potential . This is less likely to happen, the larger
the costs of running the Welfare State.
4. Conclusion
The present paper puts forward an explanation for why redistributive and growth-
oriented policies, though competing for scarce tax revenues, might go hand in hand
and bring about fast economic growth.
Our model analyzes the case of a small open economy where sustained growth
is generated by public investment in capital goods nanced through tax revenues.
In this context, a mechanism of intergenerational transfers, such a pure pay-as-
you-go social security system, that is one where pension benets are fully indexed
to wages, may provide the taxpayers with the right incentives to support growth-
oriented policies, such as investment in infrastracture or public education.
We think it is important to stress that a fully-funded social security system
would not guarantee the same result. Indeed, in a small open economy where
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capital is perfectly mobile, the rate of return from the portion of savings accruing
to a fully-funded system, which is equal to the market interest rate, is xed at
the worldwide level and is independent from the accumulation of domestic capi-
tal. Thus, in this case, agents cannot expect to benet from the growth process
through an increase of the future return on their savings. Instead, the accumu-
lation process will certainly aect the return on their contributions to a pay-as-
you-go system, through the increased productivity of labor and, consequently, the
higher level of future wages.
Two are the main results of the paper. First, we showed that, whenever the
marginal productivity of public capital in the private sector is large enough, an
outcome characterized by positive levels of redistribution and public investment
and by sustained positive growth can be supported as a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of an innitely repeated intergenerational game, where at each stage
the young choose the level of scal policies, taking into account the past histories
of the game and the consequences of their actions on those of future generations.
The credible threat to be denied the entitlement to pensions in old age by the
following generation deters the young from defaulting on the social norm.
Second, we showed that in a neighborhood of the equilibrium with positive
growth, given a change in the exogenous variables: (a) the share of public in-
vestment in labor income and the rate of growth move in the same direction;
(b) depending on whether the marginal productivity of public capital is below
or above a certain threshold, the share of transfers in labor income (that is, the
replacement rate) and the rate of growth either comove or move in the opposite
direction.
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5. App endix A
Proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix, we want to show that, given any possible history of the game,
if and only if X >X, no generation has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from
strategy st , that is, this strategy represents a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of the intergenerational game that we have described in section 3.
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First, consider the young generation at time t when, in the previous period,
the coexisting old have set tr;t 1 =  tr and i;t 1 = 

i , that is ht = (; 

i ; 

tr). If
the young play according to strategy st ; their lifetime income will be equal to:
W tF =
wt
(1 + r)
h
(1 + r +  tr) (1  

i   

tr) + 

tr

i (1  

i   

tr)
2X
i
(5.1)
On the other hand, expecting all other generations to adopt the strategy st ,
the best possible deviation for the young is to set both public investment and
transfers equal to zero. In this case, their lifetime income is given simply by:
W tB = wt (5.2)
which is always smaller than W tF if the necessary and sucient condition for the
existence of an interior equilibrium holds, i.e. X >X.
Let us now consider the case where ht = (;  0i ; 
0
tr) and N is even. Clearly, if
the young follows the equilibrium strategy, their utility is equal to W tF , whereas
if they deviate, they will be punished by the following generation and the highest
level of utility that they can obtain is W tB .
Finally, consider the case where ht = (;  0i ; 
0
tr) and N is odd. Here, we must
show that the young have always an incentive to punish the coexisting old. Indeed,
if the young adopt the strategy st their utility will be equal to:
W tP =
wt
(1 + r)
[(1   i) (1 + r) + 

tr (1  

i   

tr) [1 +  i (1   i)X]] (5.3)
By construction of  i, this is the maximum level of utility that the young can
reach when the future policies are ( i ; 

tr).
The last argument can be also used to show that the rst generation does not
have any incentive to deviate from the strategy t , which concludes the proof.
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6. App endix B
Proof of Proposition 4
We decided to omit this proof from the text, since it is not relevant for the
following discussion. This proof is available from the authors upon request.
Proof of Proposition 5
Denote the matrix of second partial derivatives of W (i; tr; r;X), calculated
at ( i (r;X) ; 

tr (r;X)), by 
22. The generic element of 
22 is then:
Wab =
@2
@a@b
W ( i (r;X) ; 

tr (r;X) ; r;X)
where a = (i; tr) and b = (i; tr).
For X > cX , the solutions to the maximization problem (2.19) are interior
and dierentiable, by Proposition 4. Then, we can apply the IFT to derive the
expressions for the partial derivatives of  i and 

tr with respect to r and X. In
particular, these are given by:
@ i
@r
=
Wtrtr  Witr
j
j
@ tr
@r
=
Wii  Witr
j
j
@ i
@X
=
 WiXWtrtr +WtrXWitr
j
j
@ tr
@X
=
 WtrXWii +WiXWitr
j
j
(6.1)
where:
Wii =  2 trX (2  3

i   2

tr)
Wtrtr =  2 [1 +  i X (2  2

i   3

tr)]
Witr = Wtri = [(1   i   

tr) (1  3

i   3

tr) + 2

i 

tr]X   1
WiX = (1   i   

tr) 

tr (1  3

i   

tr)
WtrX = (1   i   

tr) 

i (1  

i   3

i )
j
j = det (
) = WiiWtrtr   (Witr)2
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and all functions and derivatives are evaluated at ( i (r;X) ; 

tr (r;X)).
By Proposition 4, we know that Wii < 0, Wtrtr < 0, j
j > 0. Moreover,
Lemma 2 implies lim
X!1
( i (r;X) ; 

tr (r;X)) =

1
4
; 1
4

. Some algebra also permits
to verify that (Witr  Wtrtr) and (Witr  Wii) are strictly positive at all interior
solutions.
It is then immediate to verify that
@ i
@r
< 0,
@ tr
@r
< 0, for X < 1 and that
lim
X!1
@ i
@X
= 0, lim
X!1
@ tr
@X
= 0. By using numerical calculations, it is also possible
to check that lim
X!1
@ i
@r
= 0 and lim
X!1
@ tr
@r
= 0.
Now use (2.23) and (6.1) to obtain:
@ i
@X
=

 i (1  

i   3

tr) (Witr  Wtrtr) 
Wtrtr
X

 (1   i   

tr)
j
j
@ tr
@X
=

 i (1  

i   3

tr) (Witr  Wii) +
Witr
X

 (1   i   

tr)
j
j
from which we can immediately conclude that
@ i
@X
> 0, for X <1.
By making use of (2.21) and (2.22), the numerator of
@ tr
@X
can be rewritten
as:
  tr (1  3

i   

tr) + (1 + r + 

tr)
"
(1  3 i   3

tr) +
2 i 

tr
1   i   

tr
#
+
+2 tr (2  3

i   2

tr)
 
 i + r + 2

tr
1   i   

tr
!
which, by numerical calculations, can be veried to be strictly positive for ( i ; 

tr)
<

1
4
; 1
4

, so that we can conclude that
@ tr
@X
> 0, for X <1.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 imply that (1  3 i   

tr)
d i
dz
< 0, z = r; K; 
and (1   i   3

tr)
d i
d
> 0, if cX < X <1.
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There are two possible cases: either
d i
d tr
 1 or
d i
d tr
> 1. In the former, we
have:
di  (1  3 i   

tr) d

tr
dtr  (1   i   3

tr) d

i
(6.2)
while, in the latter, we have:
di > (1  3 i   

tr) d

tr
dtr < (1   i   3

tr) d

i
(6.3)
Now use (2.23) to write i = tr  
1
X
and obtain:
di
dz
=
dtr
dz
+
1
X2
Xz z = r;; K; 
By Corollary 1, we know that
d i
d
> 0,
d tr
d
> 0,
d i
dz
< 0 and
d tr
dz
< 0 z =
r; K ; . By combining these results and by using (6:1), (6.2), (6.3) and Lemma
4 , it is easily veried that
di
d
> 0 and
di
dz
< 0 z = r; K ; , for cX < X <1. It
is also immediate to verify that lim
X!1
di
dz
= 0 for z = r; K ;; .
Proof of Proposition 7
The derivative of the transfer share function with respect to any of the exoge-
nous variables is given by:
dtr
dz
= (1   i   2

tr)
d tr
dz
   tr
d i
dz
(6.4)
Let C (X; r) =
1  2 i   

tr
 tr
, Cz (X; r) =
d i =dz
d tr=dz
and Dz (X; r) = C (X; r)  
Cz (X; r). Then we have:
sign
dtr
d
= signD
sign
dtr
dz
= sign ( Dz) z = r; K; 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When r  0:5, it can be veried that Dz (X; r) is strictly positive at all interior
solutions. Therefore we can conclude that, if r  0:5, then
dtr
d
> 0 and
dtr
dz
< 0,
z = r; K; , for all X such that X > cX.
By studying the limiting behavior of the functions C (X; r) and C (X; r), it
can be veried that lim
X!1
C (X; r) = 1 and, for r < 0:5, lim
X!1
Cz (X; r) = C
0
z >
1. Therefore, if r < 0:5, we can conclude that, lim
X!1
Dz (X; r) = D0z < 0,
lim
X!1
dtr
d
= tr0 < 0 and lim
X!1
dtr
dz
= tr0z > 0, z = r; K ; . By Proposition
4, all the dierentiable solutions to (2.19) are interior solutions. Therefore, the
functions C (X; r) and C (X; r) are not dened at ( i (X; r) ; 

tr (X; r)) = (0; 0).
Still, if

 i
cX; r ;  tr cX; r! (0; 0), it can be veried that C cX; r!1 and
Cz
cX; r! C 00z 1, so that Dz cX; r!1.
By observing the limiting behavior of the function Dz (X; r) and by the con-
tinuity of  i
cX; r,  tr cX; r and Dz (X; r), which is also guaranteed by Propo-
sition 4, we can conclude that, if r < 0:5, there exists a vector of values of the
marginal productivity of public capital,
hfXzi, z = r; K ;; , cX < fXz <1, such
that Dz
fXz; r = 0, Dz (X; r)  0 for X < fXz and lim
X!eX z Dz (X; r)  0.
Therefore we can conclude that, if r < 0:5, there exists a vector of values of
the marginal productivity of public capital,
hfXzi, z = r; K;; , cX < fXz < 1,
such that
dtr
dz
= 0 for X = fXz , dtr
dz
 0, z = r; K ; ,
dtr
d
 0 for X < fXz,
and lim
X!eX z
dtr
dz
 0, z = r; K; , lim
X!eX z
dtr
d
 0.
In order to test the reasonability of the assumption by which Dz
cX; r > 0,
z = r; K ;; , we estimated the value of the function Dz (X; r) at cXe, wherecXe is dened as the minimum value of X such that an interior and dierentiable
solution to (2.19) can be calculated numerically, and found that Dz
cXe; r > 0,
z = r; K;; .
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